Author – Shaimun Haque
Abstract
This article examines Bangladesh’s remand regime as an instrument that undermines protections of liberty, due process, and freedom from torture. Synthesizing law and practice under The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 section 167, the BLAST directives, and the Torture and Custodial Death Act, it documents systemic misuse through recent episodes, including Operation Devil Hunt, the 2024 July Uprising, and the Ashulia immolation killings. Drawing on South Asian comparators, the study proposes a phased reform package on best practices: reasoned remand orders, audiovisual interrogation, independent medical documentation, counsel access, non-custodial defaults, Cooling-off period, plea bargaining, Mandatory audio-visual recording of all custodial interrogations, confession recordings and a Custody and Remand Inspectorate. With all the relevant statistical data, the study basically demonstrates the urgency of a new right based reforms. It also outlines implementation pathways, institutional and political-economy constraints, and credible metrics to restore legality and public trust.
Introduction
Why does a person’s conscience seem to awaken only in police custody? Why do confessions emerge from detainees, while fugitives and prisoners remain silent? The answer is disturbingly familiar with custodial torture. In Bangladesh, police remand is widely regarded as systemic violence. Although the law guarantees that no accused can be forced to testify or endure torture during interrogation, the reality tells a different story. For many, “remand” has become synonymous with abuse, exposing the gap between constitutional rights and the misuse of the Criminal Procedure Code 1898, (CrPC). Confessions are often extracted through coercion not conscience. Magistrates are legally bound to prevent such violations, yet they frequently align with law enforcement and government narratives, allowing the cycle to continue. Officials routinely deny allegations of torture, while the judiciary fully aware of the “systematic denial of violence” remains complicit. Remand in Bangladesh, governed by Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 (Government of Bangladesh). This article proposes structural remedies to reduce Bangladesh’s overreliance on remand, restore constitutional safeguards, and realign pre-trial practices with international human rights norms. This state is called a police state because the colonial-era Police Act entrenches authoritarian policing, enabling remand abuses, preventive detention and impunity; urgent statutory reform is needed to restore rights and accountability now. Despite constitutional protections under articles 32, 33, and 35, (Government of Bangladesh, 1972) remand has become a coercive tool for extracting confessions and suppressing dissent (Human Rights Watch, 2024). During the 2024 anti-quota protests, thousands were detained without charge amid curfews and “shoot-on-sight” orders (Human Rights Watch, 2025). This paper examines legal shortcomings and proposes rights-based reform.
Legal Framework and Judicial Guidance
Section 61 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 mandates that arrested individuals to be presented to a magistrate within 24 hours, while Section 167 allows up to 15 days of custody with recorded justifications. The 2025 amendment introduced Section 46A requiring police to inform arrestees of the reason for arrest, record it in the General Diary, notify family within 12 hours, and present a signed Memorandum of Arrest to the magistrate (Government of Bangladesh, 2025). Despite these procedural additions, enforcement remains inconsistent, and no independent mechanism exists to monitor compliance (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
Preventive detention under the Special Powers Act 1974 is an executive measure distinct from CrPC remand. Section 3 authorizes detention to prevent prejudicial acts; Section 8 requires grounds to be communicated within 15 days; Sections 9–11 establish an Advisory Board, which must receive the case within 120 days and issue its opinion by 170 days from the date of detention. (Government of Bangladesh, 1974). In practice, these provisions enable lengthy, charge-less incarceration that can eclipse judicial oversight at the pre-trial stage.
These provisions conflict with article 33 of the Constitution, which guarantees protection from arbitrary arrest and detention (Government of Bangladesh, 1972). Although parliamentary committees have recommended reforms since the 1990s, political resistance has preserved the status quo (Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust [BLAST], 2023). In practice, remand is routinely used as a default measure, with minimal justification from police or judicial authorities (Human Rights Watch, 2024).
The landmark case BLAST v Bangladesh (Rubel Killing Case) established safeguards such as mandatory medical examinations, advance notice to family and lawyers, and magistrate review of remand requests (Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust v Bangladesh, 2003). The Appellate Division upheld the High Court’s 10-point guidelines for law enforcement and 9-point directives for magistrates (Supreme Court of Bangladesh, 2016). Following this case, amendments in 2025 added safeguards to The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, including requirements for arresting officers to identify themselves, promptly notify family within 12 hours, provide medical care for injured or ill arrestees, and allow consultation with a lawyer. Though the amendment was made, still there are loopholes: the provision for remand and arbitrary arrest still remains. Also, there are no rules regarding remand implemented, like the presence of a lawyer or video and audio surveillance. The Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act 2013 criminalizes custodial torture, yet only one conviction has occurred since its enactment (Government of Bangladesh, 2013). The UN Committee Against Torture (CAT) criticized Bangladesh in 2023 for relying on internal investigations and lacking independent oversight (United Nations Committee Against Torture, 2023). Despite being a party to ICCPR and CAT, Bangladesh has failed to meet its obligations (United Nations General Assembly, 1966) (United Nations General Assembly, 1984). Writ jurisdiction under article 102 has not been effectively used to ensure accountability (Government of Bangladesh, 1972).
Contemporary Cases Highlighting Institutional Breakdown
Following the 2024 uprising, the interim government launched Operation Devil Hunt, resulting in over 11,300 detentions across Bangladesh (NDTV, 2025). Most arrests were based on vague charges, and detainees were subjected to extended remand without legal counsel. Human Rights organizations reported that remand was used not for investigation but as a mechanism of political repression. Many detainees were denied access to family and lawyers, underscoring systemic abuse.
In mid-2024, a crackdown on student protests over the reinstated quota system led to nearly 11,700 detentions and over 1,400 reported fatalities (The Daily Star, 2024). Allegations of torture, summary executions, and remand abuses emerged from multiple districts. Despite the peaceful nature of the protests, the government deployed military forces and imposed curfews. Remand was used punitively, with students and activists illegally detained and tortured (U.S. Department of State, 2025).
During the July Revolution of 2024, security forces were implicated in the burning of six protesters alive in a police van in Ashulia, Savar (The Business Standard, 2025). The International Crimes Tribunal accepted charges of crimes against humanity, including murder and incineration. The accused include senior police officers and political figures, with proceedings broadcast live (Wikipedia contributors, 2025). This incident reflects the collapse of remand into extrajudicial violence and highlights the pervasive culture of impunity.
In January 2023, two traders, a journalist, and a lawyer filed torture complaints under the Torture and Custodial Death (Prevention) Act 2013, but none led to prosecution (Dhaka Tribune, 2023). Similarly, Afroza Begum, arrested in Jashore on alleged drug charges, died in custody after being tortured (Dhaka Tribune, 2024). Her family reported extortion and physical abuse, including being tied to a ceiling fan. Amnesty International condemned the case as emblematic of entrenched impunity (Amnesty International, 2024). Despite the Torture Act, enforcement remains weak. These incidents reveal a state of exception, where constitutional protections are suspended.
Bangladesh contrasts with India, where the Supreme Court’s D K Basu v State of West Bengal case held that custodial violence violates article 21 (Supreme Court of India, 1997). The Court issued binding guidelines for arrest and detention. In Bangladesh, judicial reticence in issuing coercive orders has perpetuated systemic abuse, reflecting a deeper constitutional deficit (U.S. Department of State, 2025).
Urgency of Reform
The scale and brutality of recent abuses pose an existential threat to the rule of law and democratic legitimacy in Bangladesh. Public trust in justice institutions is rapidly deteriorating. A 2024 urban survey reported very high public fear of police custody and widespread belief that remand is misused for political ends (survey figures reported in sector literature) (Ahsan, Hasan, & Rumi, 2024). Studies and HR reports indicate that only a small fraction of detainees access counsel early and prosecutions for torture are extremely rare.
Civil-society monitoring records numerous deaths in custody across 2023–25; From January to September 2025, 34 deaths occurred involving Bangladeshi law enforcement through shootouts, torture, custody suicides, and illness revealing patterns of extra-judicial killings and systemic abuse. Among the reported cases, 13 individuals were killed in shootouts before arrest, while 9 died due to physical torture after being taken into custody. Additionally, 2 deaths occurred from physical torture before arrest, and 5 individuals reportedly committed suicide while in custody. There were also 2 deaths attributed to sickness while detained (ASK, 20250). The Ashulia immolation killings and mass detentions under Operation Devil Hunt further illustrate Remand’s role in state violence (The Business Standard, 2025). The interim government, led by Nobel laureate Muhammad Yunus, has shown that reform is possible. In 2024 there was established six commissions including one on police reform and acceded to the UN Convention on Enforced Disappearances (Human Rights Watch, 2025).
The 2025 amendment to Section 46A, section 54 and the introduction of Section 54A are steps forward. Section 46A mandates police to inform arrestees of the reason for arrest, record it in the General Diary, and notify the family within 12 hours (Human Rights Watch, 2025). Yet enforcement remains inconsistent, and no independent body monitors compliance (Government of Bangladesh, 1974). The recent CrPC amendments require officers to state the reason for arrest, record it in the General Diary/memorandum, show ID and notify family within 12 hours, and ensure access to medical care and counsel yet enforcement is inconsistent and no independent monitor oversees compliance (Government of Bangladesh, 1898).
Reform needs to be comprehensive, phased, and legally entrenched to curb abuse and which uphold citizens’ rights.
Comparative Remand Practices: A Global View
Latest pre-trial detention rates show Bangladesh at 75.6% (2022), India at 75.8% (2022), and Pakistan at 73.4% (2024) (Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research, 2022) (National Commission for Human Rights, 2025). Despite India’s D K Basu safeguards and Pakistan’s push for reasoned remand, under-trial populations remain high. These figures suggest that procedural reforms alone, without non-custodial defaults, fail to reduce pre-trial incarceration. Bangladesh is not the only country that struggles with remand laws that were introduced during the colonial period (e.g. Section 61 and 167 which speaks of arrest without warrant but no detainment exceeding 24 hours) (Government of Bangladesh, 1898).
In India it is permitted 15 days of police custody, although in a landmark case, D K Basu v State of West Bengal, (Supreme Court of India, 1997) the need to ensure judicial control and institutional responsibility was noted. South Asian countries have begun adopting selective safeguards against custodial abuse, though implementation remains inconsistent. India introduced plea bargaining but its use remains minimal, covering only minor offences (The Hindu, 2020). The Supreme Court of India also mandated CCTV and audio-visual recording of interrogations, enhancing accountability despite uneven enforcement (India Today, 2020). Also mandated a 2-3 cooling of period.
In Pakistan, remand procedures are still general, though more often, courts are requiring more specific reasons to justify remand, and are increasingly insisting on the use of lawyers to represent victims of custody (Government of Pakistan, 1898). The Lahore High Court has directed magistrates to record specific grounds for remand and emphasized legal representation during custody hearings (Lahore High Court, 2024).
The 2015 Constitution of Nepal has outlawed torture and fallen behind restitution of victims, (Government of Nepal, 2015) and includes in its 4 reforms a pilot of community-based supervision and electronic monitoring (OHCHR, 2022). Nepal’s 2015 Constitution is based on a rights approach with constitutional and international duties and requires that detainees be brought before a judge within 24 hours (Supreme Court of Nepal, 2023).
Although the implementation of judicial review, time limits, and access to an attorney has not yet mitigated the consequences of detaining individuals on a mass scale, the history of Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA) reform in Sri Lanka demonstrates the effectiveness of external accountability systems (Government of Sri Lanka, 1979).
In the United States, the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona (1966) established the Miranda Rights, which require that individuals under arrest be informed of their right to remain silent and to access legal counsel. Additionally, the use of body cameras has become standard practice to document arrests and interrogations, enhancing transparency and accountability. The United States employ plea bargaining to reduce trial backlogs while maintaining judicial oversight to prevent abuse.
Across Europe, many EU member states mandate the audiovisual recording of police interrogations and ensure the presence of legal counsel during questioning. The European Union also provides detainees with a “Letter of Rights,” which outlines their legal entitlements in clear and accessible language. Other countries have adopted similar safeguards: the Netherlands, Tunisia, and France all guarantee the right to have a lawyer present during police questioning. In the United Kingdom, the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE) of 1984 enforces video-recorded interviews, legal representation, and procedures to verify the voluntariness of statements, reinforcing protections against coercion and abuse. Also the UK and Japan mandate a cooling-off period before confessions, ensuring voluntariness and protecting against coercion (NACDL, 2019). Norway uses remand very sparingly, preferring instead restorative justice and community-based supervision ; South Korea and the UK supplement this with independent custody inspectors to monitor compliance (UNODC, 2024).
In terms of global nations, Germany eliminated coercive remand as default. The inquisitorial process in Germany employs judicial-based investigations and electronic supervision (Heard, 2023). Globally, several best practices have emerged to safeguard detainee rights and enhance transparency in criminal justice systems. Nations including Australia and Canada require mandatory audio-visual recording of all custodial interrogations and confessions, making unrecorded statements inadmissible in court (Dixon, 2008)(Law Faculty, University of Melbourne, 2018). These practices demonstrate that procedural safeguards, technological transparency, and judicial supervision collectively prevent torture, improve conviction integrity, and uphold fair trial rights worldwide
Bangladesh, on the contrary, has failed to implement reform due to judicial inactivity and political interference. The moral is this: reform must be written down, organized, and set so as to become independent of the political weather to avoid future misuse.
Statistics and Recent News & Impact of the Remand System in Bangladesh
As of 16 September 2025, Bangladesh’s prison population stood at 78,001, housed within facilities designed for only 43,000 inmates, resulting in an occupancy rate of 182% (Samakal, 2025). Notably, 75.6% of these individuals were held in pre-trial or remand custody as of November 2022, underscoring the systemic overuse of custodial detention prior to conviction (Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research, 2022). During the July–August 2024 protest wave, the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights estimated that up to 1,400 individuals were killed over a three-week period, with approximately 11,700 detained nationwide (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025). Bangladesh’s prisons held 78,001 people at 182% of official capacity; under trails & pre-trial prisoners make up 75.6% of the population (Institute for Crime & Justice Policy Research, 2025). Preventive detention was widely deployed during this period. Amnesty International documented the arbitrary arrest of over 100 Indigenous Bawm individuals under the in a single campaign, while both the US Department of State and OHCHR continued to flag a few expansive provisions as enabling arbitrary and prolonged detention (Amnesty International, 2024). The police today seem to have lost their true power of investigation. In the name of investigation, they have become almost completely dependent on remand. It appears that only after taking an accused person on remand can the police actually begin their investigation as if remand itself is their only method of inquiry. After that, three or four people are often sent to jail together as if the number of arrests proves the success of the investigation. Yet, many of them are found to be innocent. A PBI study found 52% acquittals in murder trials (1986–2015) due to flawed investigations, long delays, and weak prosecutions, urging creation of an independent investigation agency to restore judicial accountability. Analyzing 238 cases from 1986 to 2015 showed chronic issues in investigation and prosecution, including out-of-court settlements, inconsistent evidence, and excessive judicial delays sometimes extending up to 18 years. On average, cases that ended in conviction took around 1 year and 2 months for investigation and 10 years and 3 months for trial, while acquitted cases took even longer. This inefficiency undermines public trust and perpetuates impunity. The PBI recommended creating an independent investigation agency to ensure impartiality, highlighting the need for reform in Bangladesh’s justice system. (Prothom Alo, 2025).What is the basis of such investigations that send innocent people to jail? Is it really about finding the truth or just about forcing through torture and fear? If the main goal of remand becomes to extract false confessions instead of uncovering facts, then it is not justice it is the legalization of state injustice. In a related development, the government announced the withdrawal of 12,000 politically motivated cases in August 2025, many of which involved charges under the SPA, Arms Act, and Explosives Act, highlighting the breadth of overbroad and coercive legal instruments used in recent years (The Business Standard, 2025).
Implementation Challenges and Political Economy
Resistance to reform will be fierce. The remand system is embedded in power structures and a culture of impunity. Political will is decisive, and success depends on aligning civil society, donors, and institutional actors. International actors like the UN and EU must offer technical support and political leverage. The UN Human Rights Council’s 2024 report urged Bangladesh to prioritize human rights reforms and judicial independence (UN News, 2024).
Pilot reforms in Sylhet and Rajshahi are introducing audiovisual recording and digital remand tracking as demonstrate feasibility (UNDP Bangladesh, 2025). Lessons from India and Nepal show judicial pronouncements alone are insufficient. India’s D K Basu case gained traction only after legislative codification (Supreme Court of India, 1997). Nepal’s 2015 Constitution mandates restitution, but enforcement relies on judicial monitoring and civil society (Government of Nepal, 2015).
Bangladesh needs to form coalitions to make reforms part of its constitutional framework. The Judicial Reform Commission’s roadmap for 2025 calls for the establishment of an independent Supreme Court Secretariat and Judicial Appointments Commission (Dhaka Tribune, 2025). Without oversight and transparent monitoring, reforms may become cosmetic. The UN’s 2025 report found credible evidence of extrajudicial killings and called for criminal investigations (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2025). Reform needs to be legally robust, politically sustainable, and institutionally embedded.
Recommendation on Reform
To eradicate systemic misuse of pre-trial remand, Bangladesh must adopt a non-custodial default rule that presumes bail, supervised release, or electronic monitoring for non-violent, low-risk offences, with police custody justified only by specific findings of flight risk or danger. Remand should be capped at five cumulative days, with written reasons tied to concrete investigative steps.
The Constitution of Bangladesh guarantees fundamental rights for arrested individuals, including prompt notification of detention reasons and access to legal counsel (article 33(1)) as well as protection against self-incrimination (article 35(4)). However, The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898 Section 167 allows magistrates to remand suspects to police custody for further information, contradicting these constitutional rights. Thus, police remand is argued to be unconstitutional. Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act 1872 invalidate the confessions made to police. When read with the Constitution it manifests the spirit of the law is against the prevalent practice of recording confessional statements immediately after police remand. Also the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture recommends a cooling-off period of 2-3 days before recording any confession. Bangladesh should adopt this measure like India, UK and Japan.
Counsel must be present during interrogation, and full audiovisual recording should be mandatory absence of footage renders statements inadmissible. Pre and post-remand medical exams must follow the Istanbul Protocol. A statutory Custody and Remand Inspectorate should oversee compliance. By introducing a cooling-off period before recording confessions can prevent coercion and ensure voluntariness. Plea bargaining may be piloted under judicial supervision to reduce case backlogs while safeguarding against misuse. Enacting laws mandating audio-visual recording of interrogations and confessions will enhance transparency, accountability, and protection of suspects’ rights.
There is no need for structural change but need to have the potential to make the lives of detainees much better. All remand applications must be fully and comprehensively justified by the courts, aligned with international fair trial standards, and all custodial interrogations must be audio-visually recorded, with any lost or damaged footage invalidating statements in court (Human Rights Watch, 2023). These reforms are practical, cost-effective, and urgent, and would create a level of accountability and transparency.
Some reforms need institutional innovation and legislative support. A Custody and Remand Inspectorate must be established by statute. This should be an independent body with the power to perform unannounced inspections, seize custody records, and refer such cases to fast-track courts. This should be implemented under constitutional guarantees, especially articles 32 and 35, which uphold life, liberty, and freedom against torture (Government of Bangladesh, 1972). Through recent amendment has been made in CrPC but Medical safeguards must be aligned with the Istanbul Protocol, where cases criminalizing torture and ill-treatment are forensically documented also forcing accountability on the officials if it is not done so (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2022).
Long-term reforms require political consensus, budgetary commitment, and technological investment. Both GPS surveillance (Heard, 2023) and remote monitoring of non-violent prisoners should be considered, making police less reliant on physical custody and providing law enforcement with bodycams and assessing their performance against human rights benchmarks.
The adversarial system in Bangladesh places an emphasis on prosecutorial error instead of substantive equality in a defense. The lack of legal representation at the time of remand worsens this situation. The 2025 launch of the Digital Legal Aid Project enables remote legal access via video conferencing, helplines, and virtual mediation (Government of Bangladesh, 2000). It is crucial to have legal counsel at all remand proceedings and interrogations, particularly during Remand. The state must provide legal representation to indigent detainees, mainly to prevent prolonged, unjustified detention.
There is a need to think of radical restructuring of the system, as the remand system is an abused systemically in Bangladesh. Bail, house arrest, and electronic monitoring, as well as community supervision, should be regarded as a priority, particularly in minor offenses (UNDP Bangladesh, 2025). Remand should only be used as a last-resort option, and clear statutory restrictions on remand should be enforced, judicial oversight implemented, and a range of alternatives to custodial approaches embedded into the system.
Conclusion
The remand system in Bangladesh has become an instrument of state control, threatening individual liberty and subverting democratic principles. Originally created for law enforcement, it has now made arbitrary detention, custodial abuse, and constitutional violations possible. It has become a force perpetuating impunity and authoritarianism. Recent reforms by the interim government show that a change is possible and necessary. These preliminary steps provide the framework for justifiable and accountable remand procedures. Judicial protection, institutional oversight, and technological changes are key to bringing Remand into line with constitutional and international norms.
This is not simply a matter of criminal justice reform – it is a matter of constitutional obligation. Arbitrary detention undermines the rule of law as well as the supremacy of the Constitution (Transparency International, 2025). Rights under articles 32, 33 and 35 are foundational, and cannot be overridden by executive discretion (Government of Bangladesh, 1972). Sustained abuse of Remand poses a direct threat to democracy.
Reform not only needs to be legislatively enshrined but constitutionally protected. Without it, Bangladesh runs the risk of institutionalizing a police state, where executive power remains unchecked (Washington Centre for Policy, 2025). Political will, civil society pressure, and international support will decide whether the system moves towards justice and accountability.
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